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Summary 
Mortgage lending is of crucial importance for the country’s economic development. In Belarus, 
mortgage lenders face severe difficulties in obtaining the necessary refinancing to provide 
mortgage loans. Thus, this business is still underdeveloped. In this paper we put forward sev-
eral proposals to avoid worsening and to improve the refinancing situation of mortgage lenders 
(banks). We analyze possible sources of banks’ refinancing and conclude that the capital mar-
ket is the most desirable one. We recommend favouring the establishment of a system based 
on mortgage bonds, rather than on mortgage backed securities. The latter system is too com-
plex to be implemented in Belarus for the foreseeable future and the likelihood of it being suc-
cessful is low. Then, we propose the introduction of legal safety requirements for mortgage 
bonds. This will create an attractive asset class and thus increase the demand for mortgage 
bonds by private and institutional investors as well as government institutions. At last we think 
that a universal banking principle in the field of mortgage lending should be maintained in or-
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1. Introduction 
The system of mortgage lending is one of the key elements of an economic system. The most 
important economic objective is to supply a sufficient amount of capital for house building. To 
achieve this long-term capital must be attracted and be channeled into the housing finance 
market. When constructing an efficient system we face lots of aspects: government’s participa-
tion in the process, juridical problems (property rights, valuation of property etc.), land law 
perspectives, macroeconomic effects and many others. The first and most important step is to 
choose between strategic options. Thus in this paper we focus on refinancing aspects of mort-
gage lending. We will analyze possible sources of refinancing and their expediency for Belarus. 
We will answer which way of refinancing through capital markets is most appropriate for Bela-
rusian banks and why; which problems can be solved using this system and which cannot. We 
will argue about the measures needed to strengthen the mortgage lending system in terms of 
stability and safety.  
The structure of the paper is as follows: In Chapter 2 we discuss problems to be solved in the 
Belarusian housing finance system. In Chapter 3 we describe two refinancing systems based 
on capital markets: The systems of mortgage bonds (MB) and of mortgage backed securities 
(MBS). In Chapter 4 we try to distinguish the system that is more appropriate for Belarus, 
whereas in chapter 5 the question is detailed whether a universal or a special banking principle 
is more in demand for Belarus. In Chapter 6 we substantiate necessary safety-restrictions for 
such a system. Afterwards we summarize all previous conclusions and give our solutions for a 
systematic development of mortgage lending. 
2. Problem Setting and Issues for Further Analysis 
During the period 1996 till 2002, 21,888,000 square meters were built while the official turn 
for improving housing reduced only from 613,000 people to 556,000. The number of apart-
ments completed stagnated (about 3,000 square meters per year) and is regarded as insuffi-
cient by the public and the authorities. 
The current system of housing finance in Belarus is characterized by a large influence of subsi-
dies and favorable (government supported) loans. For instance, the share of favorable loans in 
all loans to private households by Belarusbank, was 90.9% in 2001. The share of (commercial) 
loans for real estate financing with non-favorable conditions was only 2.6%. But the govern-
ment plans not to keep on financing the budget deficit through NBB. So the refinancing of 
banks through the National Bank is going to decrease. Therefore the main problem to be 
solved is discovering other sources of refinancing in order to substitute the existing ones and 
to overcome the capital shortage for housing.  
 Generally the following possible resources of banks’ refinancing exist: First, central bank and 
inter-bank credit, second, bank deposits and third, capital market instruments. Credit from the 
central bank means expanding the monetary base and eventually leads to higher inflationary 
pressure. It doesn’t channel private savings as investments into the housing market. But how-
ever we do not deny the necessity of government’s subsidies for housing, but regard the cur-
rent system of funding (central bank credit) as ineffective and inefficient. Also inter-bank credit 
is just a shift of funds between banks and so doesn’t answer the question where funds for 
housing eventually come from. 
The second source of refinancing mortgage lending are bank deposits. But we are skeptical 
about this possibility in Belarus, because the volume of long-term deposits, which are needed 
for long-term bank lending, is underdeveloped. Attracting long-term deposits works only in 
stable economic conditions with low inflation.  
The third way of refinancing is the capital market. Agents like insurance companies, pension 
funds etc. make long-term investments. And if incentives were created for institutional inves-
tors to channel their assets into the housing finance market, the sharpness of the problem (in-
sufficient supply of capital) would be mitigated. For accomplishing this task, a secure tool 
should be created that is an investment vehicle and at the same time a funding tool for banks. 
There are two main tools satisfying these requirements: mortgage bonds (MB) and mortgage 
backed securities (MBS).  
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3. Mortgage Bonds (MB) and Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) as two Alternatives 
The mortgage bond system is used in many European countries such as Germany and consists 
of three participants: mortgage borrowers, mortgage lenders (banks) and investors. First, 
mortgage banks provide loans to mortgage borrowers. The mortgage banks sell mortgage 
bonds for refinance reasons. (see chart 1). A schematic circuit of mortgage bonds is the follow-
ing. 
Chart 1: The Mortgage Bond System. 
 
Generally mortgage lending includes four aspects: funding, originating, holding and servicing 
the mortgage. The three latter aspects still remain with a bank. But MBs enable to solve the 
main problem of banks’ refinancing. The right to issue mortgage bonds gives banks an effec-
tive funding instrument to be bought by investors.  
So having stressed the lack of funds as the main problem at the housing finance market, we 
may state that MBs involve a new market player (the bond investor), that otherwise would not 
operate in this market. 
Further we can identify advantages and disadvantages for each agent in the MB system: Mort-
gage bonds allow matching the maturities of a bank’s assets (loans) and liabilities. This re-
moves liquidity risk for a bank and hence reduces the liquidity-risk premium. Then the main 
advantage for a borrower should be a more affordable interest rate. Besides, in this case 
mortgage loans will be more available due to the inflow of funds to the housing finance mar-
ket. Some negative moments from the borrower’s side will be connected with rather strict con-
ditions of granting a loan. In this system a bank is still the main market agent who is exposed 
to credit risk1. So in an MB system banks will be interested in lowering the risk. This will result 
in careful monitoring the borrower’s income and solvency in order to keep up the payment-to-
income ratio at an acceptable level. An additional advantage for banks would be to have one 
more tool for conducting a profitable business with relatively low risk. The drawback of the 
system from a bank’s point of view will be credit risk exposure – mortgage loans remain on the 
bank’s balance sheet. The combination of the safety of the instrument and its liquidity will at-
tract institutional as well as private investors. Especially when it has a better credit quality 
than bank deposits and/or a higher yield-to-maturity than government securities. (For instance 
the German example shows that mortgage bonds have a yield spread of 20-50 basis points 
over government bonds). 
The alternative to mortgage bonds are mortgage backed securities (MBS). Chart 2 shows the 
schematic circuit of the mortgage backed securities system. 
The mortgage backed securities (MBS) system features a fourth participant, the so-called spe-
cial purpose vehicle (SPV) or conduit vehicle. The banks sells mortgage loans to the SPV, 
where they are bundled and securitized into MBS and sold to investors. Banks are thus able to 
sell the mortgage loans to the investors (via SPV) and to clear the balance sheet. 
                                                 
1 In contrast to credit risk we consider interest rate risk as exogenous that cannot be removed by internal factors. In 
the case of MB the bank and investor will divide this kind of risk. 
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Chart 2: The Mortgage Backed Securities System 
 
We must clarify the role of the SPV in the MBS system and the changes it generates to mort-
gage market. The SPV is not a financial institute but just a legal construction. Usually SPV are 
stockholder companies or limited liabilities companies. In some countries, notably the USA, the 
government supports an agency that creates SPV and MBS. It buys mortgages from mortgage 
originators (i.e. banks, mortgage brokers) and forms a pool of these mortgages. Actually this 
is a process of transferring mortgage ownership, i.e. a step of mortgage bundling/unbundling – 
the function of mortgage holding since then is accomplished by the SPV. The Bank becomes an 
agent that actually fulfils an operation of underwriting and basing on it the SPV purchases rela-
tively safe mortgages. Next step is a securitization of mortgages into mortgage backed securi-
ties, which begin to play a role of a medium of circulation at the secondary mortgage market. 
In comparison to the MB system the MBS system enables further re-allocation of risk. Risk 
here moves to the investors. An MBS-system allows that the risks are hold by those that are 
most willing to hold it.  Not clear. Remove it. 
The main economic advantage of the MBS-system is that it unbundles the four aspects of 
mortgage lending. Especially the allocation of risks can be more efficient. From an operational 
point of view, for banks the main advantage of a MBS system vis-a-vis a mortgage-bond sys-
tem is freeing equity capital for new loans. 
4. Mortgage Bonds or MBS? Strategic Recommendations for Belarus 
As stated above the most reasonable source of refinancing for the Belarusian banks should be 
the capital market. So we should make a strategic choice between either the MB or the MBS 
system. When making a choice there should be an awareness of investors’ incentives for pur-
chasing mortgage securities in Belarus.  
We suppose that in Belarus safety will be the strongest impulse for investing. The main advan-
tage of the MB system is an incentive for banks to keep high safety requirements. The banks 
are at the same time agents of risk holding and servicing in the MB system. That is why they 
have an incentive to reduce these risks. All the time in a mortgage bond based system, the 
credit risk remains with the same institution that originated the loan. This ensures a very thor-
ough assessment of the creditworthiness of the borrower, a very intense monitoring of the 
creditor after signing the contract and leaves little room for moral hazard. In the MBS system, 
the loan (including its risk) is sold to the special purpose vehicle (SPV). Thus, the loan origina-
tor (the bank) might not be as careful as in the alternative system when it comes to the as-
sessment of the creditworthiness of a borrower. Effective and sophisticated auditing firms are 
needed for a rating of the mortgage pool. Besides, the possibilities for fraud are much higher 
in the MBS system. Thus we mark that the MB system has an advantage over the MBS system 
from the point of view of safety. At the same time the MB system creates few grounds for cor-
ruption in contrast to the MBS system that can stimulate it in the Belarusian reality. 
The next criterion for changing a mortgage system in Belarus is a legal basis for each of the 
systems. Certainly, implementing either system will require significant amendments and im-
provement of the existing legislation. But the inclusion of a fourth participant (the SPV) into 
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the system significantly increases the number and the complexity of the necessary legal con-
tracts to run the system. This would certainly be a problem in a country such as Belarus with a 
poor record on law and contract enforcement.  
Implementing a system based on capital markets will not be an immediate process. It will take 
time and there will be a transitional period for a housing finance market to develop. But in or-
der to accelerate the implementation, a less complex system, which would incur fewer costs, 
should be chosen. An MBS system has the great disadvantage of being rather complex and re-
quiring highly developed legal and financial institutions. When choosing the MB system Belarus 
would face the necessity of creating new institutions only in case of introducing a special bank-
ing principle. Thus comparing the two systems from this point of view we again conclude the 
MB system to be more advisable than the MBS one. 
On the other hand the MBS system has got a unique advantage – a possibility of freeing banks’ 
balance sheets from mortgage loans. That is why Belarusian banks might be supporters just of 
this system, legitimating it with more stability in the banking industry. They could argue that 
mortgage interest rates would include lower risk premia, so the loans would be more afford-
able for households. Actually the MBS system is unlikely to reduce the risk in the entire mort-
gage lending cycle, but leads to a better allocation of risk. It should be mentioned that the MB 
and the MBS system could co-exist. But initially all the efforts should be focused on a single 
system; the system that might become more effective and efficient in Belarus. We consider 
that the MB system should be the strategic choice. 
5. Universal or Special Banking Principle - What is more in Demand for Belarus? 
A universal banking principle means that any bank can grant mortgage loans. By contrast a 
special banking principle means that only specialized banks can conduct this activity. Those 
specialized mortgage banks are restricted in their activities (e.g. deposit taking, other loans, 
money transfer etc. are not allowed). The requirement appears mainly from the goal of safety 
and lowering the risk exposure. Frequently MB systems co-exist with the requirement of mort-
gage banks to be specialized, i.e. that only banks that are specialized exclusively on mortgage 
lending are allowed to issue mortgage bonds, not universal banks. But this unity is not neces-
sary. We can classify the Belarusian system as universal one. According to the Banking Codex 
and the Regulation of NBB № 175 different types of banking activity should be licensed by NBB 
(6 different licensees). But there are no restrictions for receiving these licensees depending on 
banking activity peculiar to a specialist banking principle. All the requirements are concerned 
with economic figures (for instance, for being allowed to take deposits, a bank must have eq-
uity capital not less than 10 million Euro) and technical capacity of a bank. 
The main argument for specialized mortgage banks is the creation of a very stable type of 
bank that can be supervised more easily than universal banks. To give these banks an incen-
tive to grant mortgage loans and eventually to channel private savings into the housing mar-
ket, they are exclusively allowed to issue mortgage bonds. This is supposed to lead to stable 
banks. But judging the systemic stability of a banking system it is doubtful, whether a special-
ized mortgage bank is more stable than a universal bank. Further, in the short run when capi-
tal markets begin to develop, a pure mortgage bank would have no sufficient funding base, 
therefore other instruments of refinancing should be allowed. Thus, when the advantage of 
specialized mortgage banks in terms of safety is not evident and the refinancing situation on 
capital markets is still tight in the case of Belarus, we conclude that universal banking is more 
preferable. 
Table 1: New deposits by maturities (2002 / 2003) 
(Share in total volume of deposits obtained, %) 
Deposits’ maturity Share in total volume of deposits, % 
Currents deposits 8 
Under 1 month 45 
Between 1-3 months 34 
Between 3-6 months 6 
Between 6-12 months 4 
Between 1-3 years 3 
More than 3 years 0 
Source: National Bank and author’s calculations. 
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The existing deposits are unlikely to be the source of refinancing because of their short-term 
maturities (see table 1). Banks trying to limit liquidity and interest rate risks are reluctant to 
grant long-term mortgage loans on the basis of short-term deposits. 
But nevertheless banks can do a bit of maturity transformation. So allowing mortgage banks to 
take on deposits (universal banking system) will expand their funding base. Besides we can 
argue that universal banks are more profitable than specialized banks, because of unrestricted 
business activities. Universal banks evidently have a better risk diversification and hence are 
the more stable ones. Therefore even taking into account that deposits of the Belarusian banks 
are a minor source of funding mortgage loans we support the universal banking principle in 
Belarus. 
6. What is Needed to Establish a Secure System? 
Above we have slightly touched the role of the government and NBB in the system of mortgage 
lending. We marked our position that the government should enhance the safety of the system 
by regulation and supervision, without interfering into the decision-making of a mortgage 
credit institution. Thus the established economic requirements and restrictions should be the 
only tool when the system of mortgage lending is active. 
In order to make the MB safe and attractive to investors, only bonds featuring specific safety 
standards should be allowed for circulation at the secondary mortgage market. The main 
safety mechanism is the “cover principle”. Mortgage bonds should be covered at all times by 
mortgage loans at least equal to the nominal value of all outstanding issues and yielding at 
least an equal interest yield (i.e. that the interest rate for a mortgage loan granted should be 
the ceiling of an interest rate yield of a mortgage bond). Furthermore, cover assets should be 
first-charge mortgages.2 
One more criterion that should be established by the government is the so-called “loan-to-
value” ratio3. The higher the ratio the higher the credit risk is in the bank. On the other hand, 
a low loan-to-value ratio means that the borrower has to finance a bigger part of the house or 
apartment from own savings and makes it more difficult to bring borrowers and lenders to-
gether. In order to decide how to deal with this trade-off between safety and profitability, the 
main problem at the Belarusian bond market should be recalled: It is the lack of safe bonds. 
The priority should be the legal creation of safe bonds. Otherwise investors will not buy mort-
gage bonds and banks will not be able to collect long term refinancing from the capital market. 
Analyses showed that increasing the loan-to-value ratio resulted in bigger systemic risk. At 
80% loan-to-value ratio this risk becomes much more significant, especially in case of transi-
tional economies. Hence, we recommend limiting the loan-to-value ratio for mortgage loans, 
which are used for mortgage bonds, to 60%.4 
Summarizing we recommend the following measures as strategic decisions for developing the 
mortgage lending system in Belarus: 
1. The MB system should be preferred over the MBS system. 
2. A universal banking principle should be maintained in Belarus and consequently there 
should not be a specialized type of mortgage banks. 
3. The cover principle should be introduced into practice. A loan-to value ratio should not be 
set higher than 60%. 
 
D.K., Ph.S. Lectors: R.G., A.Ch. 
                                                 
2 A lender who has a first legal charge over a property will have the first call on any funds raised from the property 
sale. 
3 Loan-to-value ratio means the relation of the mortgage loan to the value of a house or an apartment purchased. 
4 This recommendation is based on the positive German experience of a 60% loan-to-asset ratio for mortgage loans, 
which are used to secure mortgage bonds. 
